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Abstract 
This senior thesis studies the character and influence of a young American naval 
officer and diplomat. George Clayton Foulk, the 1st Naval Attaché to the United States 
Legation and the 2nd U.S. Minister to Korea, brought his intellectual ability and passion 
to this East Asian country. He hoped for Korea to become an independent, modernized 
state. Due to the strong Chinese opposition and lack of assistance from the U.S. 
government, Foulk failed to realize his dream and left Korea in disgrace. However, his 
service instilled a positive image of America in the minds of many Koreans. By closely 
examining his letters and journals, this thesis brings an image of a cosmopolitan who 
expressed genuine understanding of and sympathy for Korea. More importantly, this 
thesis introduces his vision that America must become an exceptional country which 
spreads its values across the world through peaceful means. Even today, the clash 
between Foulk’s idealism and the realpolitik of Washington policymakers raises a 
question on the future of American diplomacy.            
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Introduction  
A journey to East Asia brought a strong sense of mission to America. During the 
mid-19th century, American men and women crossed the Pacific as missionaries, 
diplomats, and traders, confident that they had an ability to change the lives of people in 
an unknown world. Many saw themselves as agents of American economic expansionism, 
boldly developing new business opportunities in East Asia. Those who were religious 
also brought a fervent commitment to convert their Asian brothers to Christianity. But 
more importantly, they wholeheartedly accepted and internalized the idea of American 
exceptionalism. They believed that America, unlike other nations, built an advanced 
society based on democracy, liberty, and egalitarianism. Therefore, many proud 
Americans saw themselves as citizens of the new world, who embodied the “highest 
qualities of civilization.”1 But to them, East Asia represented an old world that gave birth 
to “humanity and civilization” but gradually fell behind the West. 2 Now, Americans 
believed that they must return the favor by teaching East Asia about their advanced 
technology, government system, and modern institutions. This idea instilled a sense of 
duty to Americans who crossed the Pacific.  
When American officials, businessmen, and missionaries stepped foot in East 
Asia, they naïvely expected East Asia to welcome their new ideas. When their 
1 Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner history of American-East Asian Relations the 
United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 4-5. 
2 Ibid., 5-7. 
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expectations turned out to be wrong, Americans used force. In 1851, Japan opened its 
ports and signed Japan-U.S. Treaty of Peace and Amity only after Commodore Perry 
threatened the Japanese officials with four American gunboats. 3  In China, Fredrick 
Townsend Ward led the troops against the Taiping movement because these rebels had 
threatened the Qing Dynasty, which had agreed to trade with the Western world.4 Korea 
encountered Americans at a much later period. A decade later, Korea also went through a 
bloody encounter with America. But it did not take long for Korea to associate the U.S. 
with hope and vision, not with violence and imperialism.    
A key pioneer in U.S.-Korea relations was a young naval officer named George 
Clayton Foulk. After graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Foulk served several 
years in the Pacific. During this period, he developed a passion for learning the customs 
and languages of the outside world. In 1884, he moved to Korea as a naval attaché and 
later served as the 2nd U.S. Minister to Korea. Through his efforts for Korea, many liberal 
Korean eventually fostered a positive image of America.  But before focusing on his 
career and achievements, it would be important to look at a brief history of U.S-Korea 
relations before the arrival of Foulk.                 
America’s involvement in Korea began during the mid-19th century. In the 1850s 
and early-1860s, several shipwrecked American sailors briefly stayed in Korea.  The 
Korean government sent these Americans to China, and they left Korea without any 
3 Ibid., 36. 
4 Alex Gouzoules, “The Use of Foreign Soldiers during the Taiping Rebellion,” Emory 
Endeavors in World History Vol. 2 (2008), accessed April 7, 2015, 
http://history.emory.edu/home/undergraduate/endeavors-journal/volume-2.html.  
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significant events.5 The first major encounter between Korea and America only happened 
in 1866, twelve years after Commodore Perry had forced the Japanese government to 
open its ports.6 In a hot, humid day of August, USS General Sherman, which carried 
Westerners and commercial goods, arrived in Taedong River near Pyongyang. At first, 
even Korean authorities did not know the nationality of the ship.7 But both onlookers and 
guards became angry when Americans detained a Korean military officer who had 
entered the boat for further inquiry.8 These crowds armed themselves with “stones, sticks, 
and bows and arrows.” When American sailors shot cannons towards the crowd and 
killed a dozen of the crowd, hundreds of Korean men attacked the vessel. In the end, 
these angry Koreans destroyed the entire ship and beat all American sailors to death.9  
After hearing reports about the murder of the crews of USS General Sherman, the 
U.S. government decided to demand reparations and open the closed doors of Korea. In 
1871, Americans sent a large expeditionary force to Korea. The troops included “five … 
warships carrying eighty-five cannons and 1,230 marines and sailors.”10 They arrived in 
Kanghwa Island, where small number of Korean troops had established forts. Kanghwa 
Island had strategic values because if enemy vessels pass through the island, they could 
5 Young-sik Kim, “A Brief History of the U.S.-Korea Relations Prior to 1945,” paper 
presented at the University of Oregon, accessed April 7, 2015, 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/943949/posts. 
6 Iriye, Across the Pacific, 36. 
7 Young-ick Lew, Korean Perceptions of the United States: A History of Their Origins 
and Formation (Seoul: The Jimoondang, 2006), 108-109. 
8 James Gale, History of the Korean People (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1983), 310.  
9 Ibid., 310-311. 
10 Gordon H. Chang, “Whose ‘Barbarism’? Whose ‘Treachery’? Race and Civilization in 
the Unknown United States-Korea War of 1871,” Journal of American History 89 (2003), 
1338. 
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move to Seoul through the Han River.11When small number of Koreans in Kanghwa 
attacked two U.S. vessels, American forces launched artillery attacks against the forts and 
sent ground troops to capture these forts. Facing a superior military power, the Korean 
forces lost 250 men while only killing three American soldiers. 12  Despite massive 
casualties, the Korean government refused to surrender. Frederick F. Low, American 
resident minister at Beijing and head of the entire military expedition, sent the Korean 
government an official request for negotiation. 13 The Koreans never responded. Tired of 
waiting for a response from the Koreans and restrained by the size of the fleet, which 
would be too small to launch further attacks towards the inlands of Korea, American 
vessels withdrew from Korea after a month of siege.14 In consequence, hatred against 
America grew in Korea.  
However, two major changes finally opened the closed doors of the hermit 
kingdom. First, in 1873, King Gojong of Korea announced direct rule and took power 
from his father, Daewongun. The father had ruled over Korea on behalf of his young son 
and supported strong anti-Western policies.15 However, Daewongun lost support among 
many aristocrats because he took away many of their privileges and spent an excessive 
11 Ibid., 1342-1345. 
12 Ibid., 1355. 
13 Lew, Korean Perceptions of the United States, 175. 
14 Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “Avenging the General Sherman: The 1871 Battle of Kang Hwa 
Do” (MA diss., Marine Corps University, 2001).   
15 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the Modern World (New York: Basic 
Books, 2012), 96.    
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amount of the budget to rebuild the palace. Unlike his father, the King believed that 
Korea must eventually accept some Western ideas and technology to survive.16  
Furthermore, non-American powers now pressured Korea to open its borders. 
They eventually tried to put Korea under their control. After modernizing its economy 
and armed forces, Japan decided to take advantage of Korea’s political instability during 
the ouster of Daewongun. In 1875, it sent a warship named Un’yo near Kanghwa 
Island.17 Japan justified the expedition as a peaceful coastal survey.18 So when Korean 
officers attacked these boats, Japan blamed the Koreans for obstructing peace and 
launched a much stronger counterattack. Outmatched by forceful Japanese weaponry, 
several Korean soldiers and civilians lost their lives. The unstable Korean government 
saw their military defeat with fear. Furthermore, even though it had opposed the Japanese 
expansion in Korea, the Qing government did not want to see increasing tensions in East 
Asia. Therefore, it sent a representative to Korea, who recommended that the Korean 
officials conclude a treaty with Japan. 19 Due to domestic instabilities and increased 
pressure from Qing, the Korean government could not oppose Japan as it had against 
America four years ago. In 1876, Korea signed the first modern treaty with Japan, which 
promised the establishment of trade ports and modern Japanese legation in Korea.20  
16 Ibid., 95-97. 
17 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 51.  
18 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and 
Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1960), 61-64.  
19 Lew, Korean Perceptions of the United States, 85. 
20 Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power, 52-66. 
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Following the Un’yo incident, even the Chinese government decided to exert 
more influence over Korea. Its traditional relationship with Korea was called “suzerain-
vassal relationship.” 21 Under this system, Korea would recognize Chinese hegemony 
over East and Southeast Asia and annually exchange gifts with China.22 On the other 
hand, China would respect the autonomy Korea by rarely interfering in domestic policies 
of the Korean government. But during the mid-19th century, China was introduced to the 
Western system of colonization. Unlike most historic Chinese empires, European powers 
used its military, bureaucracy, and international treaties to maintain tight control over 
several Asian countries and exploit their resources.23 Since the mid-1870s, Li Hongzhang, 
a high-ranking Qing official, “overstepped … the practice of the suzerain’s authority in 
traditional Sino-Korean relations.” 24 Although he did not desire to make Korea a full 
colony of China, Li changed the nature of Sino-Korean relations. He intervened in most 
economic and diplomatic decisions of the Korean government. By doing so, Li hoped 
that he could prevent Korea from falling under the hands of emerging neighbors, such as 
Russia and Japan. 25 In 1882, anti-Western and anti-Chinese Daewongun attempted to 
regain his power by launching a revolt against the King and Queen Min of Korea. 
Chinese soldiers defeated Daewongun and kidnapped him to China. 26  Korea-Qing 
21 Key-hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan and the 
Chinese Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 330-333.  
22 Ibid., 328. 
23 Ibid., 344. 
24 Ibid., 345-346. 
25 Samuel C. Chu and Kwang-ching Liu, Li Hung-chang and China’s Early 
Modernization (New York: Routledge, 1994), 154-156. 
26 Gale, History of the Korean People, 312-313. 
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Communications and Commerce Rules, an unfair treaty which granted special privileges 
to Chinese merchants, soon followed.27     
One piece of advice from the Chinese government to Korea was to establish 
diplomatic relations with the U.S. Since 1860s, China worried that Japan and Russia 
might take over Korea.28 Li believed that if Korea established relations with as many 
Western countries as possible, Japan and Russia would have less opportunity to intervene 
in Korea. Therefore, China used several channels to make Korea form a diplomatic 
relationship with the U.S For example, Huang Zunxin, a young Chinese diplomat, 
distributed his pamphlet titled “A Strategy for Korea,” to Korean delegates visiting 
Beijing. 29  This pamphlet, which became popular among Korean officials in Seoul, 
warned about Russian expansion. In order to prevent Russia from taking control of Korea, 
Huang advised the Korean readers to build strong ties with the U.S. More importantly, he 
instilled an ideal image of the U.S. Huang described America as a nation with different 
characteristics than European powers because the country was found as part of a 
resistance against British tyranny. 30  It further stated that America, as a democratic 
country which is ruled upon republicanism, is only interested in trade and communication 
but not territorial claims.31 Although it is difficult to measure the contribution of Huang 
Zunxin, Li succeed in bringing Koreans to the negotiation table. Two years after the 
27 Myungki Moon, “Korea-China Treaty System in the 1880s and the Opening of Seoul,” 
Journal of Northeast History 5 (2008), 89.       
28 Chu and Liu, Li Hung-chang and China’s Early Modernization, 179-180. 
29 Lew, Korean Perceptions of the United States, 88. 
30 Zunxian Huang, Chosun Chaengnyak-ui Wonbon-gwa Haesol-bon [The Original and 
Interpreted Version of a Strategy for Korea], accessed April 27, 2015, 
http://historia.tistory.com/1789. 
31 Ibid. 
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introduction of “A Strategy for Korea,” Korea and U.S. concluded the 1882 U.S.-Korea 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which is often called the Shufeldt Treaty.32 
Regardless of the Chinese influence, Korean diplomats had their own reasons to 
develop good relations with the United States. First of all, they believed that the 
“geographical distance between Korea and the United States” would prevent Americans 
from having “evil or ulterior motives.”33 England and France were also located far from 
Korea, but they had already established colonies in Asia by the mid-1880s. Furthermore, 
Korea not only hoped that the U.S. would limit potential Russian and Japanese 
interventions, but they also secretly hoped that America would limit far-reaching Chinese 
influence over Korea. Most importantly, Koreans accepted the idea of American 
exceptionalism from “A Strategy for Korea.” They now believed that America had a 
fundamentally different national character. Although the U.S. rarely hesitated to use force 
against seclusionistic countries, Korean officials still viewed America as a unique nation 
focused on commercial and cultural exchange.34    
Finally, the Koreans trusted American power because they lacked proper 
understanding of international treaties. Article 1 of the Shufeldt Treaty included a good-
offices clause. It said that “if another power deals unjustly or oppressively with either 
Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to 
32 David Andrew Nordmann, “Idealism, immigration and imperialism: Durham Stevens 
and the rise and fall of United States diplomacy with Japan and Korea, 1873-1908” (PhD 
diss., Indiana University, 2001), 55. 
33 Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy, “Duality and Dominance: A Century of Korean-
American Relations,” in One Hundred Years of Korean-American Relations, 1882-1982, 
ed. Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1986), 
14. 
34 Ibid., 14. 
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bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.”35 U.S. and 
most of the states normally interpreted the good-offices clause as a “sign of friendship,” 
but not as a “commitment to or guarantee of physical protection.”36 But the Korean 
government understood the good-offices clause as if U.S. had promised to defend the 
independence of Korea. In the end, all of these factors helped Korean officials erase the 
memory of their soldiers being slaughtered by the Americans eleven years ago. The 
Shufeldt Treaty was accepted by Korea with only nominal opposition.   
After the treaty, King Gojong of Korea clearly revealed his pro-American views. 
For example, he appointed his foreign advisors “almost exclusively from among 
Americans.”37 His government even accepted U.S. missionaries to Korea, hoping they 
could help the modernization of this small, East Asian nation.38 For a Confucian country 
that had murdered Catholic missionaries and eight thousand native converts fifteen years 
ago, the acceptance of American missionaries suggested the Korean government’s desire 
to establish good relations with the U.S.39 A year after the Shufeldt Treaty, the King sent 
the first official Korean delegates to the U.S. and also received the first U.S. Minister to 
Korea, Lucius Harwood Foote. The King greatly welcomed him and explicitly told the 
35 Ibid., 20. 
36 Ibid., 21. 
37 Young-ick Lew, Early Korean Encounters with the United States and Japan: Six 
Essays on Late Nineteenth-Century Korea (Seoul: The Royal Asiatic Society, 2008), 10. 
38 Ibid., 39. 
39 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2005), 96. 
9 
 
                                                          
American diplomat that he eagerly sought American support and advice. Later, Foote 
became the first foreigner to be admitted to the personal apartments of the King.40  
While the King and many liberal-minded officials sought American guidance, the 
opening of an unknown, mysterious nation also attracted a few adventurous Americans. 
During the 1880s, American businessmen, missionaries, and doctors moved to Korea for 
new opportunity. But unlike in the U.S., these newcomers in Korea did not work in a 
strictly defined occupation. Sometimes a businessman also served as a missionary. Or a 
single person performed the role of a doctor, missionary, educator, and diplomat. 
Occupation was not a big issue, because many of them believed that they shared the same 
mission in Korea. Although they sometimes revealed racist, arrogant, and paternalistic 
attitudes, most of them believed their role was to introduce American skills and systems 
to Korea. 
However, even among these adventurous Americans, a few men who overcame 
cultural difference and expressed more sympathy for Korea stood out. George Clayton 
Foulk was clearly one of them. A man of high ideals, he believed his key duty as an 
American diplomat was to help Korea become a much stronger, modernized country. But 
his idealistic vision for Korea was frustrated by lack of American government’s support 
and strong Chinese opposition. The following chapter is an analysis of a highly idealistic 
young man who was at the center of the most turbulent period in Korean history.                 
40 Lucius Foote to Secretary of State Fredrick T. Frelinghuysen, October 19, 1883, comp. 
George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, Korean-American Relations: Documents 
Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Volume 1(“KAR I”) 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 53.     
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 Foulk’s Moral and Intellectual Passion 
George Clayton Foulk was born in the small town of Marietta in Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania, on October 30, 1856,41 He had fond memories of his childhood in 
a small Pennsylvania town, where he spent time playing with his little brothers along the 
river.42 Later, he often revealed his nostalgia for his childhood years and love for his 
family in his letters from Korea. But Foulk, an ambitious, young man, wished to explore 
a bigger world. In 1872, at the age of sixteen, Foulk enrolled at the U.S. Naval Academy 
in Annapolis, Maryland.43 Although he initially struggled to adjust to a completely new 
environment, Foulk overcame the difficulties and graduated third in his class in 1876.44 
After the graduation, Foulk started his service under the Asiatic Squadron. For six 
years, he joined several flagships that sailed across the Pacific, including parts of Japan, 
Siberia, and Korea.45 During his service, he demonstrated his intelligent, hard-working, 
likeable character and therefore earned the favor of other naval officers and superiors.46 
While serving for his country, Foulk devoted his time to studying the Japanese and 
Chinese languages. 47 After his first visit to Korea in 1882, he even began studying 
41 Introduction, comp. Samuel Hawley, America’s Man in Korea: The Private Letters of 
George C. Foulk, 1884-1887(“AMK”) (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 1-2.     
42 Foulk to his parents and brothers, January 18, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 43-44.     
43 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 1-2.     
44 Ibid., 2.     
45 Yur-bok, Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887: 
A Study of Foreign Services of Minister Foote and Charge Foulk in Korea” (PhD diss., 
University of Georgia, 1965), 108. 
46 Ibid, 108.     
47 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 2-3.     
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Korean. At the end of his six-year service, Foulk returned to the U.S. to work at a library 
under the Navy Department in Washington D.C.48 While in Washington, he met the first 
official Korean delegation to the U.S. in 1883.   
From the career and achievements of Foulk, two important characteristics stood 
out. First, Foulk brought his moral and Christian passion to Korea. Unlike other 
Christians of his era, he never attempted to convert as many Koreans as possible. In fact, 
he severely criticized American missionaries who came to Korea with little knowledge of 
the country.49 He also disliked many missionaries because they created jealousies and 
rivalries among different sects. But Foulk still expressed his devout faith in God and 
believed that his religion gave him a mission to explore, build friendship with people, and 
modernize a “poor pagan nation.”50 In a personal letter to his parents, he expressed his 
Christian duty as follows. 
“I shall try to be a working Christian, to be temperate, to be honest, 
to be as you advised me to be more than once, true to myself, which 
implies truth to the training I received at your hands, and the Christian 
surroundings of my boyhood life. I say try, for I may not know my own 
strength or weakness.51  
 
 
 So even when he experienced financial difficulties and made many enemies 
during his stay in Korea, Foulk tried hard to reassure his inner self that he must not seek 
empty fame or prestige. He wrote, 
48 Ibid., 3.     
49 Foulk to his parents and brothers, September 15, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 126-127.     
50 Foulk to his parents, June 20, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 159.     
51 Foulk to his parents, July 10, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 164.     
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“I have jumped very high out of my ensign’s breeches. Some 
people might be very proud over the exaltation, but am I not still George C. 
Foulk with the same body, the same mind, the same liability to work, care 
or sickness that I had as simple ensign? Rank is a grand humbug, a 
damnable snare, wind. I don’t care for it. It would be different were rank 
commensurate with the amount of good it caused to be done.52    
“If I only worked for complimentary remarks and a name, I might 
regard myself as a grand success, for indeed I only hear good of myself…. 
But I am honest when I tell you that it is not the empty name I care for, but 
the real good and the means to accomplish it that I do want.53 
 
 
In few cases, Foulk revealed paternalistic attitudes or occasionally expressed his 
disgust at some unimagined local practices and attitudes. Still, he strongly believed that 
he had a genuine mission in Korea. At heart, he wanted to teach Koreans about the 
benefits of a new, American civilization and help them establish a more sovereign, 
westernized state. 
“There is much reason in all you have written about the bad state 
of affairs here, of the poverty and wretchedness of every other kind in 
Korea. It is no doubt to many, to most everybody, a good country to leave, 
yet I do not like to give it up … I never think about making money… Here 
are lots of chagrins and growls for me, yet all the time I can teach, can do 
good in some form or other, and feel that I am doing something towards 
the share of real work demanded of every man in the world.”54 
 
 
Naturally, Foulk hoped that the U.S. government would share his lofty ideals. He 
recognized how many Korean officials have faith towards America, and therefore tried to 
bring a response from the U.S. government. But officials in Washington, both due to 
separation by geographical distance and practical concerns over its relations with China, 
52 Foulk to his father, May 4, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 103.     
53 Foulk to his parents and brothers, January 18, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 144.     
54 Foulk to his father, May 4, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 101.     
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“remained aloof” in determining the fate of Korea.55 The gap between Foulk’s idealism 
and the State Department’s realpolitik eventually led to his demise in Korea.    
Another quality that made Foulk a unique historic character was his wide 
intellectual ability and tolerance towards other cultures. Everyone who had worked with 
Foulk recognized this young Ensign as a superb naval officer.56 But his wide arrange of 
interests prevented the young officer from becoming focused on establishing a successful 
career within the Navy. Unlike other naval officers, Foulk committed much of his time 
and effort towards mastering foreign languages. According to one record, he “acquainted 
himself with Russian, French, three dialects of Chinese, Persian, Hindustani, and 
Sanskrit.” 57 However, his interests were not solely confined to languages. For example, 
even during the era when many Protestant Americans expressed their stereotypes about 
Catholicism and Judaism, Foulk studied Buddhist culture. During his stay in Korea, he 
visited several Buddhist temples and talked at length with monks about their religion.58 
He also appreciated the designs of temples and statues of Buddha with pleasure. Soon 
after his arrival in Korea, his strong curiosity made him the first American to travel the 
inlands of Korea. For two months, with only a few companions and servants, he toured 
55 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 22.     
56 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887,” 108. 
57 Harold F. Cook, “Early American Contacts with Korea” Transactions of the Korea 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 57 (1980), 90-91. 
According to Foulk, the items lost during the looting after the 1884 coup included 
“Russian dictionary, French dictionary… Japanese grammar book… and Hindustani 
phrase book.” 
58 Foulk’s Journal, November 22, 1884, comp. Samuel Hawley, Inside the Hermit 
Kingdom: The 1884 Korea Travel Diary of George C. Foulk, 1884-1887 (“IHK”) 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 97-98.     
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Southern parts of Korea and kept a detailed diary of this trip.59 This intellectual curiosity 
and deep knowledge of non-American culture made Foulk a natural guide for official 
Korean guests in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, these qualities helped Foulk earn the 
favor of many progressive Koreans and become the highest-ranking American official in 
Korea within a few months after his arrival. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Introduction, comp. Hawley, IHK, 1-20.     
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 May 1884 – January 1885: Foulk’s Empathy and Political Alliances 
The first official Korean delegation to the U.S. arrived in Washington on 
September 15, 1883.60 King Gojong of Korea, who believed that America could provide 
technological support and undermine Chinese influence over Korea, selected many young, 
progressive Korean men as members of the trip.61 During the mission, Korean officials 
met President Chester A. Arthur and John Davis, Acting Secretary of State.62 They also 
visited manufacturing exhibitions, model farms, educational institutions, telegraph and 
postal offices, and other government institutions. Awed by the things that he had seen in 
America, even a pro-Chinese, semi-conservative head of the delegation named Min 
Yong-ik later told Foote: 
“I was born in the dark; I went out into the light, and now I have 
returned into the dark again; I cannot as yet see my way clearly, but I hope 
to soon.”63 
 
Shortly before his meeting with Korean officials, President Arthur searched for an 
official who could assist the Koreans throughout the trip. None of the Korean delegates 
could speak English, but at least two of them spoke some Japanese. Since he failed to 
find a suitable official from the State Department, Arthur selected Foulk and ordered him 
to accompany the Korean mission.64 During this period, Foulk grew tired of his work in a 
60 Frelinghuysen to Foote, March 15, 1883, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 32-33.     
61 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887, 68-70. 
62 Frelinghuysen, March 15, 1883, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 33.     
63 Foote to Frelinghuysen, June 17, 1884, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1885 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1885), 126.     
64 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887, 70. 
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quiet, uneventful library. 65 In order to start a new overseas journey, Foulk had already 
requested his superiors to send him back to the Asiatic Squadron.66 Perhaps out of a hope 
to find new opportunities in Washington, he accompanied the Koreans with great vigor 
and good information. From Boston to Washington D.C., he toured for two months with 
the delegation and introduced the Koreans to as many modern developments as 
possible.67  Since most members of the Korean delegation were young reformers in their 
20s, Foulk’s youth and energy helped him leave a good impression on many Korean 
visitors.  
 
Impressed by Foulk, Min Yong-Ik made a special request to the Department of 
State. He asked if Foulk could join their return trip and continue to work in Korea, 
building stronger U.S.-Korea relations.68 However, even though Foulk personally wished 
to return to Asia, the State Department could not arbitrarily send someone who was still a 
part of the Navy. After consultation with the State Department, the Navy Department 
appointed Foulk as the Naval Attaché to the United States Legation in Seoul.69 But 
during this period, the Korean government did not have its own navy. Therefore, every 
official knew that the Navy created this title solely for Foulk’s mission to Korea.70 Due to 
65 Gary D. Walters, “The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 
1883,” Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1969), 107. 
66 Harold J. Noble, “The Korean Mission to the United States in 1883” Transactions of 
the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 18 (1929), 5-7. 
67 Walters, “The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 1883,” 102-
106. 
68 Ibid., 107.     
69 Noble, “The Korean Mission to the United States in 1883,” 14-16. 
70 Walters, “The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 1883,” 107. 
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the unprecedented nature of his position, he received a rather broad, unclear description 
of his role from Secretary of the State Frelinghuysen. He asked Foulk to, 
“Make trips of exploration and find out the nature and resources of 
Korea, inform the State Department on naval subjects in Korea, and give 
advice on nautical and kindred and other pertinent subjects to the Korean 
government.”71 
 
 
From the phrase, “give advice on,” Frelinghuysen probably expected Foulk to not 
only work for the interests of the U.S. but also help the Korean government modernize its 
country and raise its international status. But when Foulk gave many hearty advises to the 
King, he faced huge opposition from pro-Chinese Koreans and disapproval from 
American officials.   
On November 16, 1883, Foulk and three Korean officials boarded the USS 
Trenton.72 For six months, the USS Trenton sailed across the Atlantic, stopped in a few 
European cities, passed through the Suez Canal, and finally arrived in Korea in May 
1884. 73  Even during the long trip, he taught Koreans about the importance of 
modernization and instilled a good image of the United States. In one episode, the Korean 
delegates saw Egyptian artifacts at the British museums in London. Foulk described how 
these items were “taken by force from other countries” and compared British imperialism 
71 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887, 72. 
72 Walters, “The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 1883,” 108-
109. 
The rest of Korean officials took a train to San Francisco. They sailed across the Pacific 
and arrived in Korea several months earlier than Foulk and three other Korean officials.     
73 Ibid., 109-110.     
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with friendly, non-imperialistic American foreign policy.74 Overall, most Korean officials 
returned to Korea with a “good impression of the American people and government.”75  
On May 31, 1884, after a six-month journey, Foulk finally landed in a small port 
village of Chemulpo. His first impression of Chemulpo was that it represented the 
backwardness of Korea. In 1884, only about 1,200 people lived around this small port 
area. On the same day, he wrote his first letter to his parents and brothers, describing the 
things that he had seen in Korea.   
“The outlook for me is not a cheering one. Things are dismal 
looking one every side, the boats, the boatmen, the shore, the islands. I am 
indeed going into a land of pagans. ”76  
“On going on shore with Pyon Su I found Chemulpo to be a 
wretchedly muddy, poverty stricken place… The Korean houses are poor 
straw hovels with mud for their flooring.”77 
 
 
But he still left his family with a hopeful message by suggesting that he would do 
his best to help this hermit kingdom.  
“Yet I am prepared to rough it. I mean to be in earnest in all I do, 
as I hope I have been so far, have no need to lie, or steal or wrangle, and 
do not see why I should not make friends with the people and get their 
help. While I am brave enough in looking at the prospect as a whole 
before me, doubtless my eyes will be wet when the Trenton sails form 
here, and I am left practically alone among these pagan people78 
 
 
74 Ibid., 110.     
75 Ibid., 110.     
76 Foulk to his parents and brothers, May 31, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 27.     
77 Foulk to his parents and brothers, June 15, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 29-30.     
78 Foulk, May 31, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 27.     
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 His mixed attitude towards Korea was typical of an ambitious person who would 
venture to a foreign land. While Foulk was eager to make great accomplishments in 
Korea, he simultaneously recognized that his job would be a very tough one.     
Soon after the arrival of Foulk, the State Department made one significant change 
which indicated its lack of interest in Korea. In July 1884, it reduced the grade of the U.S. 
Minister to Korea from “that of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to that 
of Minister Resident and Consul General.”79 While announcing this message, Secretary 
Frelinghuysen assured Minister Foote that such a change did not mean “disparagement of 
Korean dignity or want of appreciation on the part of the United States.” 80 He also 
reassured Foote that his salary would not be reduced. Despite assurances made, Foote 
gloomily received the news. As an old man in his late-50s, he felt it would be 
unnecessary to stay in a foreign country while bearing the “loss of his rank” and 
expensive cost of living.81 Two months later, he complained to the State Department 
about his hardships and declined his new appointment as the Minister Resident and 
Consul General to Korea.82  
“If I have in any manner succeeded, it has been with the sole 
purpose of extending the influence of my country and of opening new 
fields for her commerce. The change of rank detracts nothing from the 
character of the position … But to these (Koreans), proud that the United 
States should have sent to them a Minister of the first rank, it is impossible 
to explain the reasons for the change, without leaving the most unfortunate 
impressions … the Minister … is no longer clothed with the same 
importance and influence. For this reasons I must respectfully decline the 
79 Frelinghuysen to Foote, July 14, 1884, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 36.     
80 Ibid., 36. 
81 Foote to Frelinghuysen, September 17, 1884, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 37-
38.     
82 Ibid., 37-38. 
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appointment which His Excellency the President has so graciously 
tendered to me.83  
 
 
 Two months later, on December 4, 1884, a climatic event happened in Korea. 
Young, progressive Korean officials, including a few men who had traveled to the U.S. in 
1883, launched a coup against conservative, pro-Chinese officials.84 They expected to 
gain support from several hundred Japanese soldiers guarding their Embassy. However, 
Japan quickly withdrew support once it realized that their soldiers were outnumbered by 
Chinese troops. The progressives lost power in only three days, and most of them either 
escaped to Japan or lost their lives.85 In the midst of the violence, Foote helped foreign 
residents in Seoul seek refuge in the American legations office. He moved back and forth 
between Seoul and Chemulpo, evacuating American civilians escape from Korea and 
negotiating a treaty between China and Japan. 86 Since the presence of an American 
official would dissuade violent gangs from attacking the palace, Foote even left his wife 
to stay in the dangerous palace for many days.87 After the conclusion of the treaty, Foote 
believed that he could not tolerate more hardships in Korea. In January 1885, Foote and 
his wife abruptly left Korea and returned to California. Soon after the arrival, Mrs. Foote 
died due to illness. Some historians blamed her physical and mental hardships in Korea 
for causing her untimely death.88  
83 Ibid., 37. 
84 Jong-suk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910 
(Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 70-71. 
85 Ibid., 70-71. 
86 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887,” 98. 
87 Ibid., 99. 
88 Ibid., 104-105. 
21 
 
                                                          
Whereas Foote gradually lost interest in Korea during the second half of 1884, 
Foulk brought his energy and vigor to the U.S. mission in Korea. In some ways, he 
expressed his deep sympathy towards Foote. He admitted difficulties in establishing a 
productive relationship with Foote, because his ambiguous role as a naval attaché 
overlapped with Foote’s responsibilities as a minister.89 But Foulk still thanked Foote for 
his kindness. Furthermore, after the State Department announced Foote’s demotion, 
Foulk once again expressed his sympathy towards the old man.  
“Minister Foote has sent his resignation to the State Department 
because by act of Congress at the last session his rank and pay were 
reduced. I think he does very rightly and that our government has made a 
great error… Now the government hauls in its horns and the Koreans think 
America is going back on them after all its fair promises. Minister Foote is 
terribly humiliated and very justly thinks himself badly treated.” 90   
 
 
But over time, Foulk lost his feelings for Foote.  He criticized Foote for his lack 
of ability and energy. For example, Foulk compared himself with Foote and argued that 
while “General Foote learned next to nothing of the actual state of affairs” he personally 
could “talk to many Koreans and do learn everyday of things which General Foote ought 
to know.”91 More importantly, Foulk believed that Foote often distrusted him, rather than 
crediting him for his sincere advice. After the failed 1884 coup, Foote often cared too 
much about his personal safety. Foulk thought Foote was tarnishing the image of a proper 
American diplomat. He portrayed the old diplomat as a timid person who would like to 
89 Foulk to his parents and brothers, July 2, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 39-40.     
90 Foulk to his parents and brothers, October 26, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 67-68. 
According to the official documents from the State Department, the U.S. government did 
not reduce salary of Minister Foote. However, one could deny that he had suffered from 
financial problems during his service in Korea.      
91 Foulk, July 2, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 39-40.     
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skedaddle to Japan, in order to flee from the turbulent situation in Korea.92 Moreover he 
blamed Foote for leaving the U.S. legations with large amounts of unpaid debt.93     
However, it would be difficult to agree with all of Foulk’s criticisms against Foote. 
Initially, Foote also succeeded in building good relationship with the King. Furthermore, 
even while worrying about his personal safety, Foote mediated a treaty between China 
and Japan after the coup. Foote received unfair judgment from Foulk because he only 
saw the last one-third of his eighteen-month service in Korea. Similar to how Foulk 
would suffer in the future, Foote went through financial difficulties due to the lack of 
support from Washington. Furthermore, unlike Foulk, he raised a family and therefore 
brought his wife to Korea. He worried not only about his personal safety, but also about 
his wife’s conditions. Still, Foote doubtlessly lost his passion for Korea coincidentally 
with the arrival of Foulk. Also, Foulk clearly enjoyed more advantages than Foote: his 
language ability and his youth. So while Foote spent his last six months in Korea without 
great vigor, Foulk energetically built friendships and made extensive journeys to areas 
untouched by non-Koreans. This energetic first six months of George C. Foulk could be 
summarized into two major aspects: his sympathy towards Korea and his development of 
strong opinion about progressive and conservative factions in Korea.  
Compared to other foreigners, Foulk demonstrated a high level of understanding 
and sympathy for Korea and its people. He clearly recognized the rampant poverty of 
Korean people and believed that many of their traditions were culturally backward. 
Despite these beliefs, Foulk showed respect to many aspects of Korean culture. Also, he 
92 Foulk to his father, January 5, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 80.     
93 Foulk to his parents and brothers, April 19, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 98.     
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accepted the good will of many Koreans with gratitude. In a May 1884 letter from 
Nagasaki, he described his first taste of Korean food. Surely he did not appreciate every 
part of the meal, as he admitted that the food “may have seemed queer” to a typical 
foreigner.94 But he believed that the food was better than he expected and described a few 
dishes as being even “better adapted to European taste than Japanese food.”95 Since an 
adjustment to local taste was one of the main difficulties awaiting him, Foulk believed his 
overall satisfaction with Korean food as an optimistic sign. So even during his two-month 
journey in rural Korea, he ate the same food with his Korean companions and local hosts 
without much difficulty. Furthermore, unlike other Christians, Foulk expressed deep 
interests in the Buddhist tradition of Korea.  
“I traveled twenty-nine days, living on Korean food … and did not 
see anybody during the interval except Koreans. Nearly the whole journey 
was unknown to foreigners and of course I was an immense curiosity… 
Korea is not a land of great wonders in the way of great buildings or other 
evidences of wealth and grandeur as we look them… Then too, old and 
fixed as is the way Koreans have, there are relics of things which have had 
their day even here. There are relics of Buddhist temples of great size, 
curious rock carvings, representing the ancient gods of the people, etc. All 
these I had the pleasure of seeing, in addition to learning some of the 
geography, language, customs, etc. than has probably any other person in 
the world96 
 
 
Foulk’s interest in Korean culture gradually shifted towards his sympathy for the 
people. During his first month in Seoul, he recognized the giant gap between the few 
government bureaucrats and the rest of the people. He defined the relationship as, 
94 Foulk to his parents and brothers, May 21, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 25.     
95 Ibid., 25. 
96 Foulk to his parents, December 1, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 71.     
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“Here there are, broadly speaking, only two kinds of people, the 
officers and the common people. The former are all rich and great, the 
latter all poor, dirty and helpless.”97  
 
 
Three months later, on November 1, 1884, Foulk launched his two month journey 
to the Southern provinces of Korea. Ever since his arrival in Seoul, he dreamed of 
making an extensive journey to all parts of Korea. After the Southern trip, he planned to 
make two more trips to the Northern provinces of Korea.98 But a tense political situation 
and his promotion to the Minister to Korea prevented Foulk from launching further trips. 
Still, he became the first American to travel outside of Seoul or several port cities of 
Korea. 99 Throughout this journey, he vividly watched the loathsome situation of the 
common people and judged Korean bureaucrats as cruel, incompetent men.  
Whenever he came into a direct contact with the common people, he remarked on 
their harsh situations. Although Foulk recognized Korea as a poor country, he discovered 
that many Southern parts of Korea had rich rice fields. Some of the fields even looked 
“better, neater” than the farmlands that Foulk had seen in Japan.100 But, he found out, 
“Yet contrary to my expectations, though rice is produced in great 
abundance, I fail to see evidence of the wealth or of the prosperous 
condition of the country spoken of by so many Koreans of Seoul. The 
houses of the people and their dress are far inferior to those about 
Seoul. 101  
 
 
97Foulk to his parents and brothers, July 2, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 36-37. 
98 Introduction, comp. Hawley, IHK, 3.     
99 Ibid., 3-4. 
100 Foulk’s Journal, November 4, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 30.     
101 Foulk’s Journal, November 9, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 49.     
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 He learned how local officials took away large amounts of rice and justified their 
practices as preparation for war, famine, and the spring season.  However, when food was 
scarcest during the spring, the officials returned less rice than they had taken before.102 
Foulk therefore criticized the bureaucrats who systematically caused the farmers to 
remain poor. He believed that these farmers should be able to share the benefits of rich 
rice fields.      
His sympathy for average Koreans and dislike of high-ranking officers grew when 
he became an official guest in several cities. Governors, military officers, and local 
bureaucrats joined banquets hosted for Foulk. To him, they demonstrated their lack of 
knowledge on diplomatic issues involving Korea. Local officials knew nothing about the 
ongoing war between China and France. They also did not know that China and Japan 
were having disputes about the status of the Ryukyu Islands.103  Much worse, many of 
them knew little about the geography of Korea. When Foulk asked the distance from 
Chinju to Tongrae, two major Korean cities, no one sitting in a meeting gave a correct 
answer. 104 They also rarely traveled cities outside of their residence. These episodes 
reinforced the image of an incompetent Korean government. 
Unfortunately, the only thing the Korean officials were good at was tormenting 
and stealing things from their own people. When the sightseers came to watch Foulk, 
they had no understanding of personal privacy. Out of curiosity, some of them even 
followed Foulk when he went to the toilet. But his dislike of these locals quickly turned 
102 Foulk’s Journal, November 2, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 25.     
103 Foulk’s Journal, November 11, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 56.     
104 Foulk’s Journal, November 24, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 103.     
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into sympathy when low-ranking officials often dispersed the crowd by hitting them with 
sticks.105 Or when the officers needed to travel across towns, they forced peasants to 
furnish torches without proper payment. If local peasants refused to work, officials often 
beat them.106 However, the worst enemies of the common people were Achons, modern-
day equivalent of tax collectors. They collected exorbitant amount of rice, cotton cloth, 
and silk from the taxpayers.107 Foulk concluded that the Korean government ruled its 
people by relying on terror. In consequence, most Koreans became passive, weak men 
who even feared achieving personal success and becoming a hero because it would lead 
to more jealousy and suspicion from the government.108  He concluded, 
“It has been the custom of this government to get rid of strong men 
physically and mentally among the common people, fearing the use of 
their power against it. Thus such men are made to live in fear and 
silence… The hero of Tongyong, after killing so many Japanese for his 
country (a man of the people), knew that this display of his power would 
cost him his life, and standing on top of his junk in plain sight of the 
Japanese fleet, shot himself with a Japanese pistol or gun, thus to avoid 
dying like a criminal!109  
 
 
Therefore, even during the early months of his stay in Korea, Foulk found small 
things that he could do to help Korea. During his tour with the Korean delegates in 
Washington, Foulk helped them receive a large number of seeds from the Department of 
Agriculture. 110 Later, Korean officials distributed the seeds to many local areas and 
achieved some success. Foulk also personally brought some other kinds of seeds from 
105 Ibid., 103. 
106 Foulk’s Journal, November 6, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 39.     
107 Revenue of Korea, November 27, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 114-115.     
108 Foulk’s Journal, November 21, 1884, comp. Hawley, IHK, 93-94.     
109 Ibid., 93-94.     
110 Noble, “The Korean Mission to the United States in 1883,” 16-17. 
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America and planted them in a place which he named “American Farm.” 111  He 
recognized how “nobody here ever saw or knows how to use cabbage, tomatoes, potatoes, 
beets, corn, and sugar cane.”112 Next, Foulk used his small knowledge about dairy life to 
educate Korean farmers about milking technique and introduced some agricultural tools. 
He hoped one day the Koreans would “awake to (agriculture’s) importance” and increase 
the wealth of their country.113 Finally, using his seven-year experience as a naval officer, 
Foulk taught Koreans how to use and store some weapons that they had purchased before 
his arrival.114  
While Foulk searched for ways to help and educate Koreans, he also witnessed 
the violation of basic human rights. For Foulk, one of the first unforgettable scenes in 
Korea was public execution. He described the details of these public executions to his 
family. In Korea, the executor beheaded the criminals as family members of the prisoners 
watched the scene.115 Worst of all, perhaps out of intent to create a brutal scene, the 
executor used a poorly designed sword. Therefore, the head of the prisoner did not fall 
from the body in a single cut. Out of disgust, Faulk described,  
“Every now and then I hear that “Heads go off today.” About three 
weeks ago, sixty people – robbers, counterfeiters, etc.  were beheaded… 
On the men are placards stating their crimes. Behind each go the wife, 
children, and other relatives… The executioner is always made half drunk. 
The sword is so dull and poorly made that from eight to fourteen cuts must 
be made before the head is severed. Often legs and arms are chopped off 
111 Foulk to his parents and brothers, August 12, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 51.     
112 Foulk to his parents and brothers, July 22, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 43.     
113 Foulk to his parents and brothers, August 31, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 54.     
114 Foulk, July 22, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 43.     
115 Foulk, August 12, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 51.     
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first. I cannot imagine anything more horrible than to see a man’s head 
chopped off, nick by nick, as you would fell a tree.116  
 
 
His concern for basic human rights multiplied when government officials hunted 
down people whose relatives had participated in the 1884 coup. After the failed coup, 
gangs led by pro-Chinese, conservative officials massacred several Japanese residents. 
Foulk’s personal Japanese cook went missing, and he assumed that he had been killed by 
these gangs.117 Most of the conspirators of the coup escaped to Japan. Unfortunately, a 
few of them failed to escape. They lost their lives in a very brutal way. In his letter to the 
State Department, Foulk described the horrible details of the executions.  
“These persons were placed face down in the streets and 
decapitated by from six to ten blows of a dull instrument, while a rope 
secured to their queues served to open the wounds. The bodies were all 
dismembered and distributed about the streets for exposure for three or 
four days.118  
 
 
In a way of retaliation, the Korean officials murdered fathers, brothers, wives, and 
even young children of the conspirators. Despite many risks, Foulk helped some of the 
relatives who had managed to hide from the authorities. He gave money to the mother of 
So Kwang-bom, one of the key leaders of the coup.119 Before the coup, So enjoyed a 
promising career as a young reformist. Only twenty-five years old, he was selected as a 
member of the Korean mission to America by the King, who had enjoyed his reports on 
116 Ibid., 50-51.     
117 Foulk to his parents and brothers, December 20, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 77.     
118 Foulk to Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard, January 31, 1885, comp. McCune and 
Harrison, KAR 1, 117.     
119 Foulk, January 5, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 80.     
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his visit to Japan and had given “unhindered access” to see him.120 Furthermore, So was 
one of the three Koreans who had traveled across the Atlantic for six months with Foulk. 
But after the failure of the coup, he barely escaped to Japan and his family faced 
retaliation. Later, some of So’s close friends came to Foulk to ask for poison, so that his 
relatives could commit suicide when they could no longer escape from the authorities. 
Although shocked at such idea, Foulk gave them morphine and laudanum because he 
knew the women in So’s house would suffer more from being captured than committing 
suicide.121 He cried,   
“What must you think of me, to have been thrown in such 
barbarism as this? It will not be difficult for you to imagine what a mental 
strain such things enacted right under my very nose bring upon me.”122  
 
 
Although slightly frightened by these incidents, Foulk assured his family of his 
safety. He once again criticized Minister Foote, who had hurriedly left Korea after being 
“frightened for his life.”123 Unlike Foote, he declared he would stay in Korea and change 
many things about this underdeveloped, hermetic country. A religious man, he personally 
prayed to God to come to Korea and use his power.  
“I believe, however, it was all for the best – the execution of the 
prophecies of the Bible. Good must come out of it. This land is so dark, so 
God-less, so full of pagan cruelty, oppression, vice and misery that it 
seems to me only natural the vengeance of the just God should fall on 
it.124 
 
120 Walters, “The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 1883,” 
Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1969), 9. 
121 Foulk to his parents and brothers, February 5, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 90.     
122 Ibid., 90. 
123 Foulk to his parents and brothers, March 12, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 92.     
124 Foulk, January 5, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 84.  
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But Foulk also knew he could not idly rely on his prayers alone and therefore 
asked himself what he could do to modernize Korea. 
One more key aspect of Foulk’s first six months in Korea was his own assessment 
of several Korean leaders. Even among the young Korean officials who had visited the 
U.S. and traveled with Foulk, disagreements over reform led to rivalries. Min Yong-ik, 
the nephew of the powerful, pro-Chinese Queen Min of Korea, used his personal 
connections and became a powerful official at a young age. Min, So Kwang-bum, and 
Pyon Su were three Koreans who traveled with Foulk for more than six months. Foulk 
believed that these young men, especially a powerful person like Min, would use their 
experience and vision to introduce American technology and ideas to Korea. But unlike 
the other two, Min withdrew his support for reforms soon after his return from the U.S. 
Later, he even purged several progressives from the Korean Army.125 This angered So 
and Pyon.  
Foulk expressed solidarity with So and Pyon and criticized Min. After arriving in 
Korea, he described Min as a “Chinese lover at heart” who worked “against the 
development of his country according to (America’s) ways.”126 In another letter, Foulk 
called him a coward who feared China and pro-Chinese conservatives among his family 
friends. While supporting strong measures against the conservatives, he even admitted:  
125 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 10.     
126 Foulk, June 15, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 29-30.     
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“You may be surprised to hear it, but if the heads do go off one 
will be that of Min Yong-ik, because he obstructs the country from 
becoming civilized.127  
 
 
 Two months later, the progressives almost killed Min during the coup; he barely 
survived after receiving medical treatment from an American doctor.128 When he saw a 
badly wounded Min, Foulk expressed pity to this young Korean. But he still criticized his 
political stance, calling him a poor, weak-hearted man who “allowed himself to be used 
as a tool to China against what he thought right.”129 Still, it would be surprising to hear 
the suggestion of beheading a person from a man who had expressed strong disgust over 
the public execution scene. 
Contrary to his harsh criticism of Min Yong-ik, Foulk expressed sympathy and 
personal support towards progressive Korean officials. Before his arrival, he built good 
relations with So Kwang-bom. Foulk described him as “most liberal of all the 
Koreans.”130 He especially valued liberals like So after he realized that most of the nobles 
“depended on their Chinese religion” while “opposing Western ideas.”131 Furthermore, in 
order to make accurate reports about situations in Korea, Foulk needed to build a strong 
friendship with the progressives.  From his progressive friends, he learned about their 
initial plans about the coup.  A month before the coup, So came to Foulk and openly told 
127 Foulk, October 26, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 67. 
128 Foulk, January 5, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 84. 
129 Ibid., 84. 
130 Foulk to his parents and brothers, July 22, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 45.     
131 Ibid., 44. 
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him that it would be impossible to bring agreements with conservatives like Min.132 
During the conversation, So even strongly advocated “the assassination of ten person, six 
of whom are very high officials.133 After the end of the conversation, Foulk recognized 
that a violent crisis would soon happen in Korea. He immediately reported the 
information to Foote and the Navy Department.134 In this report, he positively labeled the 
progressives as the “truly loyal party in Korea” who “possessed any knowledge of the 
principles of Western government.”135  
But even though he strongly supported the progressives, Foulk recognized the 
circumstances which disfavored the liberals. Although the King gave passive support for 
the progressives, they were still outnumbered by the Queen, her Min family, and other 
conservatives. Foulk also recognized that the progressives did not have enough money to 
build a political alliance and outnumber conservative groups backed by China.  
Furthermore, even during the Sino-French War of 1884, China still stationed 1,500 
soldiers in Seoul. Finally, Foulk viewed the progressives as “so pure, amiable and 
earnest.”136 In a turbulent country, men of pure, amiable, and earnest character would 
never survive through treacheries and betrayals. Therefore, the progressives failed to gain 
power in Korea.137 
132 Report of information relative to the revolutionary attempt in Seoul, Korea, December 
17, 1884, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 111. 
133 Foulk, October 26, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 66.     
134 Report of information relative to the revolutionary attempt in Seoul, Korea, December 
17, 1884, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 111. 
135 Ibid., 104-105. 
136 Foulk, July 22, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 45 
137 Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 71. 
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Finally, the more he sympathized with the progressives, the more Foulk disliked 
the Chinese officials. Ironically, it was Li Hongzhang who had recommended Korea to 
establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. But Foulk and several other Americans in 
Korea bitterly criticized the conduct of the Chinese government. Before coming to Korea, 
Foulk had already established strong opinion and stereotypes about the neighboring 
countries of Korea. While he viewed Japan as a modernized state ruled by a progressive 
government, he saw China as a backwards state. 138  He analyzed that most of the 
conservatives in Korea still regarded China as a model country and strongly believed in 
Chinese culture and religion, while often criticizing Western values as sinful or 
barbaric.139 After spending a few months in Korea, Foulk believed that China’s Korea 
policy was hypocritical. On paper, the Shufeldt Treaty declared Korea to be an 
independent state. However, in reality, the Chinese government sent troops to Korea, 
planted powerful allies within the Korean government, and murdered Foulk’s best 
Korean friends.140Later, thousands of Chinese merchants arrived in Seoul without the 
permission of the Korean government and established monopolies in several businesses, 
threatening Foulk’s plan to encourage “Korean trade with the Americans.” 141 Outside of 
Korea, Foulk also heard news about indiscriminate killings of foreigners in Tientsin by 
angry Chinese people during the Sino-French War. 142 Therefore, he believed that if 
America let China to do whatever they want in Korea, the U.S. government would 
138 Foulk, May 4, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 103. 
139 Foulk, July 22, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 44. 
140 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 15.     
141 Foulk, August 31, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 54.     
142 Foulk, October 26, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 70.     
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compromise the future of both the Korean people and foreigners in Korea.143 With a 
mildly imperialistic tone, he wrote letters supporting the French victory and criticizing 
Chinese threats against Korea.  
“I fear our government will not take firm enough steps to enable 
Americans to control in Korea… If the French do not continue the war 
with China, do not whip her, Korea and China will surely become 
dangerous for foreigners to reside in.”144 
 
“It is the Chinese, of all people of the semi-civilized world, who 
kick against the civilization of reason, maintaining that that of custom is 
the right one. It is this which has made them keep troops here, which made 
them carry off the father of the King to China, which made them prop up 
against the King and people the families like that of Min who are lovers of 
China through fear and the privileges allowed them by her. This Chinese 
cloud thrown off of Korea, and I know the King and people will do all that 
can be expected to introduce the good of the Western world.145  
 
 
 Therefore, even though the U.S. government told Foulk to treat Chinese officials 
with caution, his antipathy towards China often prevented him from easily accepting 
“Chinese suzerainty over Korea.” 146 Naturally, he built tense relationships with Chinese 
officials, especially with Yuan Shikai, the Chinese Imperial Resident of Seoul. Later, the 
Chinese government created a plot to remove Foulk from Korea.    
During the first six months of his career in Korea, Foulk did everything he could 
to know more about the country and its people. He befriended the King of Korea and his 
officials, traveled the inlands of the country for two months, and revealed his genuine 
passion for Korea. Now, it was time for Foulk to use his energy and knowledge to 
143 Ibid., 70. 
144 Ibid., 70. 
145 Foulk, May 4, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 102. 
146 Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,” Pacific Historical 
Review 2 (1933), 295. 
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establish strong U.S.-Korea relations and help the modernization of this Asian country. 
Perhaps in recognition of these abilities, the State Department promoted this 28-year old 
young naval officer to the U.S. Minister to Korea, the highest-ranking American position 
in this unknown country.  
Sadly, Foulk did not receive the news with full excitement. Most of his political 
allies and friends lost power after a failed coup. Now, he faced an insurmountable 
obstacle from Chinese and pro-Chinese Korean officials and a weak King who, at heart, 
supported reforms but remained overly cautious about pushing modernization and 
angering China. Therefore, Foulk celebrated the new year of 1885 with both hope and 
despair. Increased authority and prestige as a Minister could help Foulk work for 
Koreans’ struggle for sovereignty and modernization. But Foulk also lost most of his 
trusted allies in Korea. Gradually he recognized growing Chinese opposition towards his 
service and lack of support from Washington.       
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January 1885 – June 1887: Foulk’s Success, Failure, and Departure 
In January 1885, George Foulk became the new U.S. Minister to Korea, while 
concurrently serving as the naval attaché to Korea. Besides giving occasional advice to 
the King and his government, he searched for things that he could accomplish in Korea. 
Soon, he decided to bring more American companies and missionaries to Korea. 
Personally, Foulk did not use his influence to “make money for himself.” 147  Also, 
although being a Christian, he respected traditional Korean religions and opposed 
excessive proselytizing by his fellow Christians. But Foulk believed that American 
businesses could strengthen ties between Korea and the U.S. and introduce modern 
technology to Korea. Furthermore, he hoped that the missionaries would help him by 
establishing schools and hospitals for the Korean population. 
First, Foulk introduced American businessmen to a variety of economic 
opportunities in Korea. He built a close relationship with the American Trading Company 
of Yokohoma and one of its agents, W. D. Townsend. 148 Foulk and Townsend worked 
together to expand business opportunities in Korea. For example, he introduced different 
147 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887,” 157. 
148 Cook, “Early American Contacts with Korea,”, 101. 
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kind of animals for government-owned farms and also brought furniture to the palace, 
earning more favor from the King.149 Next, Townsend brought arms and ammunition for 
nascent Korean military. Even years after the departure of Foulk, the American Trading 
Company was able to use its close relationship with the Korean government. On March 
22, 1897, after receiving a concession to establish Korea’s first railroad, Townsend and 
his company opened a railway which connected Seoul and Chemulpo.150  
Meanwhile, Foulk believed that the Korean government could raise revenue by 
signing contracts with American companies. For example, he collected samples of pearl 
oysters from Korea and sent letters to businesses like Tiffany and Co.151 He repeatedly 
communicated with his American friends and asked about the prices of the pearl. Several 
months later, Foulk finally found someone who would be interested in finding pearls 
from Korea. In the summer of 1886, an American named H. A. Norrell acquired a right to 
excavate pearls from the Korean government. 152  In return, he promised to pay ten 
percent of the profits to Korea 
In the end, Norrell failed to excavate as many pearls as he had expected in 
Korea.153 Also according to today’s standard, some of these economic concessions only 
promised a small share of profit to the Koreans. But cases including pearl oysters all 
showed how Foulk worked diligently to find opportunities for both American businesses 
and the Korean government.  
149 Ibid., 101-102. 
150 Ibid., 101. 
151 Foulk, April 19, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 100.     
152 Notes, comp. Hawley, AMK, 232.     
153 Ibid., 232.. 
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Next, Foulk helped bring many American missionaries to Korea. He “drew a clear 
distinction between education and medical missionary work on the one hand and 
evangelical or gospel preaching missionary work on the other.”154 After watching an 
infighting among the Presbyterians and Methodists, he borrowed a quote from a Japanese 
minister, who had said,  
“Missionary work is an institution to provide a respectable, easy 
livelihood, and a vocation to a number of men and women not over-gifted 
with brains, or knowledge of religion.”155  
 
 
Nevertheless, Foulk still believed that missionaries would eventually help Korea 
because these devout Christians had selflessly built schools and hospitals across the 
world. An American who grabbed Foulk’s attention was Dr. Horace Newton Allen. A 
missionary and a physician from Ohio, Allen was sent by his Presbyterian church to work 
as a doctor in Korea. His personal goal was to “establish a mission-dominated and royally 
supported government hospital.”156 When Foulk learned about this goal, he intervened in 
favor of Allen. Although the King internally had some concerns about the role of the 
missionaries, Foulk persuaded him that a new, modern hospital would help the Korean 
people.157 In April 1885, after receiving subsidies from the Korean government, Allen 
opened the first modern hospital and institution named Jejungwon. Next year, Allen also 
opened Korea’s first medical school as part of Jejungwon. For more than hundred years, 
Jejungwon played a crucial role in Korean medical history. Both its hospital and medical 
154 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887,” 160. 
155 Foulk, August 18, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 126-127.     
156 Lee, “Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the United States, 1882-1887,” 162. 
157 Ibid., 162. 
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school still exist today as part of Yonsei University, which was also found by an 
American missionary during Foulk’s tenure in Korea. And even after Foulk’s departure 
in 1887, Allen continued to work in Korea until 1905. Between 1897 and 1905, he also 
served as the U.S. Minister to Korea and led an unsuccessful lobbying effort for Korea. 
He met Theodore Roosevelt and persuaded him to see Japan as a potential threat to 
America and therefore oppose its colonization of Korea. His career in Korea ended 
shortly before Japan effectively took control of Korea in November 1905.                
Besides Allen, Foulk also established close relationships with many other 
American educators and missionaries. John W. Heron, Henry G. Appenzeller, Horace G. 
Underwood, and William B. Scranton were names of figures that are still recognized for 
their service for Korea. They received much advice from Foulk on how to earn the 
support of Korean people.158 Feeling highly positive about their impacts, Foulk reported, 
“The work of these missionaries cannot, to my mind, be too highly 
commended. They have done much to introduce a spirit of order and 
neatness among the Koreans… In the school attached to (Jejungwon) a 
dozen young gentlemen are enthusiastically studying professions, and 
rewards for faithful work are promised them by the Government. The 
spectacle presented by this little group of highly-esteemed Americans, 
with their good work and bright homes in the midst of this dense, far off 
people …, is creditable to the people of America, and alike creditable to 
Korea. ”159 
 
 
So even though the impact of these benevolent missionaries could have looked 
small in the eyes of American policymakers in Washington, many Koreans saw them as 
visionaries who made contributions towards the modernization of Korea. Since he had 
158 Ibid., 164. 
159 Foulk to Bayard, June 3, 1886, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1887 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), 222.     
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helped these missionaries throughout his diplomatic career, Foulk was also highly 
appreciated.   
Besides typical administrative work as a diplomat, Foulk was involved in many 
different fields of activities. But during the process, he undesirably made many enemies. 
Foulk did not face strong opposition when he pursued less controversial issues, such as 
the improvement of Korean agriculture or the establishment of modern hospitals and 
schools. However, when he tried to bring American military advisors to Korea, his 
political opponents saw Foulk with suspicion. Conservative Korean officials and Chinese 
diplomats in Seoul considered him their enemy. They believed that an American official 
who could utilize his determination and knowledge for the independence and 
modernization of Korea could become an important threat against Chinese suzerainty. 
 Unexpectedly, Foulk’s first major enemy was a pro-Russian official named Paul 
Georg von Möllendorff. A German from a lower Prussian aristocratic family, 
Möllendorff first came to Korea as an advisor to the Korean Foreign Office in 1882. A 
linguist, he was also one of few Westerners who boasted a good knowledge of Asian 
culture and language. 160 After helping Korea conclude treaties with several Western 
nations, Möllendorff earned personal trust from the King of Korea.161 Since he arrived in 
Seoul after receiving recommendation from Li Hongzhang, Möllendorff initially worked 
160 Walter Leifer, “Paul-Georg von Möllendorff -Scholar and Statesman,” Transactions of 
the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 57 (1982), 42-45. 
161 Ibid., 45. 
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in favor of the Chinese government. 162  But later, he broke with the Chinese and 
developed close relationship with the Russian diplomatic mission in Korea.163  
Shortly after his arrival, a small incident led Foulk to dislike Möllendorff. The 
American Trading Company, which worked closely with Foulk, secured an exclusive 
right to develop and sell timber from Ulleung-do, an island located in the middle of the 
Sea of Japan (East Sea). But British and German merchants later exploited the Koreans’ 
lack of knowledge on modern contracts and the replacement of relevant officials after the 
coup. They concluded a similar logging contract with the Korean government. Foulk 
believed that Möllendorff was behind the plot. So even though American, British, and 
German merchants later agreed on a compromise, Foulk began to distrust Möllendorff.   
Foulk once again clashed with Möllendorff when he interfered with his yet 
unrealized plan to bring American military advisors to Korea. Instead of allowing 
American advisors, Möllendorff attempted to bring Russian drill instructors to train the 
Korean troops.164 Foulk’s anger grew when he discovered that most of Möllendorff’s 
dealings with Russia had taken place without any consultations with Korean officials or 
the King.165 Möllendorff’s attempt to bring Korea under Russia influence disturbed all 
other Great Powers. His activities especially bothered Great Britain, which attempted to 
stop Russian expansion at all cost and therefore even fought a war against Russia in 
Afghanistan. In April 1885, British troops seized Port Hamilton, an island located miles 
away from the Southern coast of Korea. This island was crucial for Britain because it 
162 Foulk to Bayard, July 5, 1885, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 81.     
163 Ibid., 81 
164 Ibid., 81. 
165 Ibid., 82. 
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could now monitor vessels sailing from south to either the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan 
(East Sea).166  Later, Foulk worked with the Korean government to prepare a settlement 
with Britain and asked the British Navy to withdraw its troops from the island. After two 
years, the British troops withdrew from Port Hamilton in February 1887. 
When Korea once again became a hot spot for imperial powers, Foulk believed 
that Möllendorff must be blamed for creating a diplomatic fallout. He wrote to the State 
Department that Möllendorff had intended to put Korea under Russian control and once 
again asked Secretary of State Bayard for American advisors.  
“It may be said, however, that the general effect of the negotiations 
was towards establishing Korea as the protectorate of Russia; ulterior 
objects to this can at present only be surmised… I would respectfully and 
earnestly beg the attention of the Department of State to those parts of the 
correspondence on this subject, which pertain to the employment of 
American assistants in Korea.” 167  
 
 
A month later, Foulk also accused Möllendorff of extracting valuable Korean 
goods to a museum in Shanghai for personal gain and blamed him for surrounding 
himself with “low pack of Koreans. 168  
Therefore, Foulk used his extensive network in Korea and demanded “the 
dismissal of von Möllendorff from the Korean government for his unfitness to advise the 
government in its dealings with the foreign representatives.” 169 He boasted his good 
relationship with the King when the King dismissed Möllendorff from the Foreign Office 
166 Foulk to Bayard, May 19, 1885, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 74.  
167 Foulk, July 5, 1885, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 81-83.     
168 Foulk to his father, August 4, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 120.     
169 Ibid., 120.     
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on July 27, 1885. After hearing the news, Foulk never expressed sympathy towards the 
German but simply gave a brief assessment of his career in Korea, calling the German 
advisor as one-time “agent of China” and later an agent of Russia.170 After the British 
occupation of Port Hamilton, the Russian government recognized its lack of resources in 
the Far East and strong opposition from Britain, China, Japan, and the United States. 
Until the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia decided to limit its role in Korea.   
Despite the successful removal of Möllendorff, that event never suggested the 
decline of Chinese power over Korea. China still remained a big brother to Korea. Also, 
it sent more soldiers, advisors, and officials after the failed coup of 1884. A month after 
Möllendorff’s dismissal, Foulk reported how the relations between Korea and China was 
turning into a “complete dependency,” not a sovereign state.171 In an address given at the 
Chinese legation, the Chinese official stated: 
“Korea is to China as lips to the teeth, and (being thus members of 
one body) each must share the joys and sorrows of the other.”172 
 
 
Later, one of the Chinese commissioners in Korea even described that his position 
was the “equivalent of the Resident under England, in India.” 173  Furthermore, the 
Chinese government announced a plan to build Korea’s first telegraph line, which would 
170 Ibid., 120-121.     
171 Foulk to Bayard, August 16, 1885, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 126. 
172 Ibid., 126-127. 
“Lips to the teeth” became widely known when Mao Zedong used the phrase when he 
sent 1.3 million soldiers of People’s Liberation Army to fight with North Korean 
communists during the Korean War. Recent articles and journals still use this phrase to 
describe China-North Korea relations.    
173 Ibid., 127. 
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facilitate communications between Seoul and Beijing. 174  Finally, Chinese officials 
practically incorporated the Customs of Korea into the Customs of China, disrupting 
Foulk from bringing American businesses and goods to Korea.175 
As the highest ranking American official in Korea and unofficial advisor to the 
King, Foulk watched all of these developments with deep concern. More importantly, he 
built a negative relationship with Yuan Shikai. Yuan came to Korea in 1885 as the 
Chinese Imperial Resident of Seoul, the position in charge of all Chinese troops in Korea. 
Both Foulk and Yuan were young, energetic men in their late 20s. But Foulk did not get 
along with Yuan and criticized both his policies and character. On the surface, Yuan 
acted as if he would continue to work together with Foulk under favorable terms. But 
behind the scenes, Yuan tried to thwart the modernization efforts of Foulk and wished to 
force the young American diplomat to leave Korea. Foulk recognized the true intent of 
Yuan and wrote unfavorably of him. 
“Mr. Yuen [Yuan Shikai], the Chinese hoodlum, seems to have 
observed that in spite of his brutal threats and intrigues, I have managed to 
put the hospital, the hospital school of chemistry, the Royal school for 
nobles, and a common school for the people, into Korea; have got a 
powder mill going, a revenue steamer flying the Korean flag successfully 
bringing in the King’s revenue to the capital … Theses things are fixtures 
and now Mr. Yuen evidently wants to make people think he did it all with 
me! And so he has swung around and has asked me not to go away from 
Korea.”176        
 
 
 After recognizing the real goal of Yuan, Foulk became even more critical of the 
Chinese government. He repeatedly warned others about the evil intent of Chinese 
174 Foulk, September 25, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 132-133. 
175 Foulk, April 23, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 147-148. 
176 Foulk to his parents, December 3, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 180.     
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officials. Furthermore, he argued that besides a few number of conservatives, most 
Koreans did not want China to control their country and willingly accepted Western 
influence and advice.  
“It seems to me that China now aims at something at least akin to 
incorporation of Korea into her own empire. If such a move be intended, it 
comes too late and must fail Koreans are more than usually united in 
guarding the independence they possess practically, and are greatly 
strengthened by the treaties with Western Powers. The country is quiet, 
and fresh signs of progress are visible among the people.177   
 
 
Therefore Chinese and conservative Koreans recognized Foulk as their enemy. So 
they devised strategies that would force him to leave Korea. First, the conservatives tried 
to undermine his safety. Since the failed 1884 coup, Foulk repeatedly faced rumors about 
his personal security.  His friends heard a false story that Foulk had been killed by a 
group of mobs during the coup.178 Due to poor communication, it took more than a 
month for Foulk to dispel that rumor. Next year, rumor spread in the U.S. that a new 
violent event happened in Korea. Foulk believed that the Chinese made up this rumor “to 
prevent other countries from interesting themselves in Korea.”179 In consequence, Foulk 
constantly reminded his family and friends of his status, as they had always worried 
about his security. He often reminded people that his main concern was the lack of the 
U.S. government’s involvement in Korea, not his personal safety.180 But it was highly 
likely that there had been an attempt on Foulk’s life. In May 1887, even a Russian 
177 Foulk, April 23, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 148-149. 
178 Foulk to his parents and brothers, January 18, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 85.     
179 Foulk to his parents and brothers, January 2, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 140.     
180 Foulk to his parents and brothers, September 28, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 131.     
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representative in Seoul met American officials and warned them how “owing to the 
desperate character of the Chinese minister (Foulk’s) life might be in danger.”181    
But even though Foulk remained largely unaffected by growing threats against his 
life, Chinese officials finally seized an opportunity to damage Foulk’s reputation. 
Throughout his stay in Korea, Foulk often sent his detailed analysis of Korean politics 
and leaders to the State Department. Although most of these reports should have been 
classified as CONFIDENTIAL, the State Department included several of his letters in its 
annual publication titled Foreign Relations of the United States.182 As expected, Foulk 
made negative descriptions of Chinese influence in Korea and praised the progressives 
who had launched a coup in 1884.183 More importantly, he made blasphemous comments 
about the royal family. He first criticized the Queen and the Min family of putting the 
Korean government practically under their control.184  
“The Government of Korea has been for an indefinite period under 
the practical control of the Min family, of which the Queen of Korea is the 
highest representative. The blood of (Min) family is largely Chinese, and 
it has been always, and remains the desire and aim of this family to subject, 
and retain in subjection, their country to the suzerainty of China.”185  
 
 
But even worse, Foulk reported secret personal stories between the Queen and the 
King, which included details of their sex life. He also criticized the Queen for her lavish 
spending. Foulk added,  
181 Foulk to his parents and brothers, May 9, 1887, comp. Hawley, AMK, 197. 
182 Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 76. 
183 Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,” 300. 
184 Report of information relative to the revolutionary attempt in Seoul, Korea, December 
17, 1884, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1886 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1886),, 335.     
185 Ibid., 335. 
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“It is commonly reported that the King long refused association 
with the Queen, who practiced various superstitious rites to attract him, 
and was aided in this by the members of her family, who are notoriously 
regarded as the greatest patrons of geomancers, fortune tellers, &c, in 
Korea. When the present prince royal was about to be born the Queen 
sacrificed to the various gods to such an extent, most notably for forty-
nine days at Kum-gang-son, that the expense attending it, which fell 
directly on the people, gave rise to national complaint.”186  
 
 
Finally, Foulk hinted that the Crown Prince’s poor health might have been caused 
by consanguinity.187 Considering that it was a taboo to openly talk about the details of the 
King or the Queen, the State Department should not have disclosed such information to 
the public.188   
Later, parts of Foulk’s were reprinted in Chinese newspapers published in 
English.189 They included details of the corruption of the Min family and personal stories 
of the Queen and the King. After the Chinese officials read the newspaper, they used the 
contents of the article to build negative opinions of Foulk within the Korean leadership. 
The King, who still maintained good relations with Foulk, personally wished him to stay 
in Korea. 190  However, he could not prevent the Chinese-controlled Korean Foreign 
Office from criticizing Foulk.191 
186 Ibid., 335. 
187 Ibid., 335-336. 
It was true that both the Queen and King’s biological mother, who would be Queen’s 
mother-in-law, came from the same Min family. Genealogical tree showed that they were 
5th cousins. But that alone did not prove that consanguinity had led to the Crown Prince’s 
poor health.  
188 Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,” 300. 
189 Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 76. 
190 Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,” 30. 
191 Ibid., 301. 
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When news about these reports circulated in Korea during the spring of 1887, 
Foulk was no longer the U.S. Minister to Korea. He made fewer conversations with the 
State Department and only worked as a naval attaché.  But pro-Chinese officials 
recognized his good knowledge and his intimacy with the King. Therefore, they decided 
to completely remove Foulk from Korea. So they used this opportunity to strongly 
demand the American government to dismiss Foulk from the position of naval attaché.192  
Hugh A. Dinsmore, a lawyer from Arkansas, recently replaced Foulk as the new 
U.S. Minister to Korea. He advised Secretary Bayard that Foulk should be allowed to 
stay in Korea. Dinsmore believed that China was using this event as a “test case” to find 
out the level of American involvement in Korea.193 Foulk also sent numerous messages 
to the State Department and expressed his good will towards the Korean people.194  
But in the end, China got what it had wanted. The State Department initially tried 
to defend Foulk’s actions. But Chinese and pro-Chinese Korean officials relentlessly 
pressured Washington to dismiss Foulk. Even Yuan Shikai sent a personal letter to 
Dinsmore and described how Foulk had damaged good relations between China and the 
U.S.195 In the end, Secretary Bayard changed his mind and decided to recall Foulk from 
Korea. He told Dinsmore:  
192 Ibid., 301. 
193 Yong-suk Jung, “The Rise of American National Interest in Korea: 1845-1950” (PhD 
diss., Claremont Graduate University, 1970), 86. 
194 Foulk to W. W. Rockhill, January 2, 1887, comp. Spencer J. Palmer, Korean-
American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United 
States, Volume II (“KAR II”) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 58-59.     
195 Yuan Shikai to Hugh A. Dinsmore, May 28, 1887, comp. Palmer, KAR II, 76-77.     
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“The motive in certain quarters to get rid of Mr. Foulk may be 
stronger than the facts brought forward to effect his removal. However this 
may be, the inexpediency of pressing Mr. Foulk further upon the Korean 
Government as a representative of the United States is evident.”196     
 
 
In the letter, Bayard also used the term persona non grata, which meant that an 
individual was “not welcome in a particular place because of something they have said or 
done” against a particular state.197 Even though most of the officials in Korean Foreign 
Service had been appointed because of their good relations with China, the State 
Department concluded that their request to dismiss Foulk must be respected. After 
consultations between Bayard and officials from the Navy, the Navy Department 
declared that it would “relieve Ensign Foulk as Naval Attaché, and to order him to report 
for duty, on board the USS Marion.198 Later, Bayard also sent a message to a Chinese 
diplomat. He said “that the action of this government has thus incidentally been in the 
line of satisfaction of the Imperial Government of China is naturally a cause of 
congratulation.”199 On June 26, 1887, Foulk finally left Korea for Nagasaki. 
Foulk’s eventual departure was the product of China’s effort to get rid of any 
person that would oppose its control over Korea. But it would be wrong to say that his 
demise was solely the result of an opposition from China. Throughout his years in Korea, 
Foulk tried to raise American awareness of Korea and deepen ties between Korea and the 
196 Bayard to Dinsmore, June 17, 1887, comp. Palmer, KAR II, 78.     
197 “Persona non grata,” Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, accessed April 18, 2015, 
http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/american_english/persona-non-
grata. 
198 Bayard, June 17, 1887, comp. Palmer, KAR II, 79.     
199 Bayard to Shu Cheon Pon, June 16, 1887, comp. Palmer, KAR II, 80.     
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U.S. But his efforts always received little support from pragmatic and realistic officials of 
the State Department.  
Their apathy stemmed from the fact that they had seen no advantages of helping 
the Korean government. Simply put, Korea never offered large economic and political 
opportunity that could interest Washington. First, Korea never boasted a large population 
that could potentially become a large market for American businesses. Both Foulk and 
the Korean government knew the difficulty of attracting American businesses. Therefore, 
Korean officials designed economic policies that could satisfy American entrepreneurs.  
Between 1882 and 1905, the Korean government granted special privileges to the 
U.S. businesses. 200  For example, an American company secured the right to excavate 
gold from Unsan district. This mining district turned out to be the richest gold mine area 
in Korea.201  Other concessions, such as logging rights in Ulleung-do and the right to 
establish Korea’s first railway, soon followed.  
But even with these concessions and efforts by Foulk, Korea still remained a 
relatively less important diplomatic partner of the U.S. Historian Jong-suk Chay 
described Korea-U.S. relations of this period as “Diplomacy of Asymmetry.”202 This 
definition made sense because while Korean officials had judged the share of American 
influence in their country to be immense, American counterparts had believed that Korea 
played only a minimal role in their overall trade and other forms of interaction. For 
200 Foote to Frelinghuysen, July 19, 1883, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 53.     
201 Spencer J. Palmer, “American Gold Mining in Korea’s Unsan District,” Pacific 
Historical Review 31 (1962), 381.  
202 Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 1-4. 
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example, even twenty-two years after the conclusion of the Shufeldt Treaty, total amount 
of U.S.-Korea trade was only $1,014,086.203 While this million-dollar trade accounted 
between ten and twenty percent of Korea’s international trade, it accounted less than 
0.05% of America’s international trade. 204 At the same time, total volume of U.S.-China 
and U.S.-Japan trade, respectively, was 80 and 103 times larger than that of the U.S.-
Korea trade.205  
Non-economic statistics also suggested asymmetry in U.S.-Korea relations. No 
one could doubt that a few number of American missionaries made great contributions to 
the modernization of Korea. They built Korea’s first modern hospitals and schools, which 
produced numerous Korean leaders of the early-20th century. 206 By 1910, American 
missionaries headed more than one-thirds of all Korean academic institutions.207 But 
from the perspective of American policymakers, these Americans only accounted 0.9% 
of all missionaries from the U.S.208 Between 1898 and 1905, the number of Korean 
converts also hovered around one percent of the total men and women proselytized by 
American missionaries.209  
American popular media also shared the lack of interest in Korea. Between 1896 
and 1910, except during the Russo-Japanese War, the New York Times only published an 
203 Ibid, 2. 
204 Ibid, 2. 
205 Ibid, 2-3. 
206 Lew, Korean Perceptions of the United States, 163-164. 
207 Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 6. 
208 Ibid, 5. 
209 Ibid, 5. 
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average number of twenty-three articles about Korea per year. 210 Other newspapers, 
which did not enjoy as expansive global network as the Times had owned, published 
much less number of articles about Korea. Such facts and statistics showed how Foulk 
had faced an uphill battle when he unsuccessfully persuaded American officials to 
provide more support for the Korean government and his mission. 
The first major rejection for Foulk came when the American government refused 
to send American military advisors to Korea. Since the conclusion of the Shufeldt Treaty, 
the King highly demanded American military advisors who could help Korea develop a 
modern army. On behalf of the King, both Foote and Foulk repeatedly sent messages to 
the State Department and reported how the King had anxiously wanted “some Military 
Officer who could organize the Korean Troops.”211 Their letters also warned that if the 
King could no longer wait for a response from Washington, Russia or other European 
powers could take over the advisory position.212 But the State Department did not listen 
to their plea. Secretary Bayard replied,  
“It is clearly the interest of the United States to hold aloof from all 
this and do nothing nor be drawn into anything which could look like 
taking sides with any of the contestants or entering the lists of intrigue for 
our own benefit… It may be especially needful for you to let it be 
distinctly understood that your government in no wise originated or is now 
disposed to press the proposal to obtain United States Military officers as 
instructors in Korea.” 213 
 
 
210 Ibid, 11. 
211 Foote, September 17, 1884, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 56.     
212 Foulk to Bayard, May 15, 1885, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 58.     
213 Bayard to Foulk, August 19, 1885, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 64-65.     
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Bayard also pessimistically replied to Foulk that it would be very difficult to 
receive an approval from Congress. In the same letter, Bayard also warned Foulk that he 
should be careful in helping Korea or giving advices to its officials.  
“It is deemed proper to instruct you to communicate without 
reserve, with the United States Ministers at Beijing and Tokyo … These 
three countries, China, Japan, and Korea, bear to the United States a 
common, almost identical relation in this Korean matter, and the United 
States can take no action which might even in appearance, seem to favor 
or oppose the policy of either China or Japan.214 
 
 
Three American military instructors finally arrived in Seoul in April 1888, five 
years after the King’s initial request and a year after Foulk’s departure.215 But even these 
officers proved to be incompetent instructors. Only two years after their arrival, the 
Korean government fired two of these advisors.216 Furthermore, it also took two years for 
the U.S. government to send its school teachers to Korea, even though they would be less 
controversial figures than the military instructors. Therefore, although he finally received 
the news about the arrival of teachers, Foulk pessimistically said “it was questionable as 
to whether (Korea) could support the teachers and schools.”217 
Moreover, the State Department never gave enough financial support to Foulk and 
his legation. When he became the U.S. Minister to Korea, he inherited a poor legation 
which owned no funds, but some unpaid debt. Personally, he also lost $800 worth of 
214 Ibid., 65. 
215 Donald M. Bishop, “Shared Failure: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1888-
1896” Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 58 (1983), 53-76. 
216 Ibid., 53-76. 
217 Foulk to his parents and brother, January 17, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 117. 
54 
 
                                                          
goods when Korean gangs vandalized his home during the aftermath of the coup.218 In 
order to improve his financial conditions, both private and public, he searched for 
business activities that would help both the Korean government and his office. However, 
the State Department warned Foulk that “it is undesirable that a legation abroad should 
appear to advocate concessions or exclusive privileges of trade or business in favor of its 
countrymen.”219 
But even though it had dissuaded Foulk from deeply engaging in business 
activities that could help his legation, the State Department never tried to alleviate his 
financial concerns. Foulk once expected that he would need an extra amount of $10,000 
each year to run the American mission in Korea.220 But the State Department never 
promised adequate amount of money. It only asked Foulk to draw the salary of both the 
Naval Attaché to Korea and the U.S. Minister to Korea, which would only give him an 
extra “2,500 dollars a year.”221 But even this was not a legally proper idea for Foulk, 
because he had worried “such an act (would) be unconstitutional so long as (he) holds a 
commission in the navy.”222 His disappointment with the American government grew 
when even the poor, incompetent Korean government compensated him for his losses 
during the 1884 coup. He could not understand why a relatively rich American 
government would refuse to give enough financial support to his mission. In his personal 
journals, Foulk harshly criticized the American government. 
218 Foulk, January 5, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 82.     
219 Foulk, July 2, 1884, comp. Hawley, AMK, 39.     
220 Foulk to his parents and brother, November 10, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 134. 
221 Foulk to his parents and brother, May 15, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 105. 
222 Ibid., 105. 
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“I am in debt, have no outfit of any kind, clothes or other 
necessities, am mentally played out and with no certain future, am in a 
bewildering tangle, certain of but one thing, which is that our government 
is a corrupt, ungrateful institution almost criminally negligent of its duties, 
and unworthy of any man’s honest service, and the flaunting name it 
shoves on other and sometimes better governments.223    
 
Although he started out as a young soldier and an official who loved to learn a 
new language and interact with a new culture, Foulk slowly lost his passion as a diplomat 
and advisor. With more responsibilities, hardship, and humiliation but no reward, he 
wished to serve only as a naval attaché. On February 18, 1886, he submitted a letter of 
resignation, requesting “that the Department provide a relief to take charge of the 
legation.”224 In this letter, he criticized the lack of political, financial, and moral support 
by the United States.  
“The state of affairs in Korea has been one of excitement and 
gravity, such as to necessitate unceasing observation and watchfulness, 
and an amount of office work and embarrassing duty, in other respects, 
which I have only been able to execute under constant and severe strain. It 
is simply impossible for one person to execute for any length of time, 
without clerical assistance, the work called for at this legation.225    
 
 
However, Foulk’s resignation still did not end his troubles with the U.S. 
government. William H. Parker, Foulk’s initial replacement, arrived in Seoul on June 8, 
1886. 226 Despite initial hopes, he turned out to be an incompetent diplomat. Parker 
suffered from alcohol abuse and neglected his duty. He earned great disfavor of Korean 
officials and failed to help American civilians and marine guards who had occasionally 
223 Foulk to his parents and brother, April 24, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 153. 
224 Foulk to Bayard, February 18, 1886, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 40.     
225 Ibid., 40. 
226 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 18.     
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stopped at Chemulpo.227 So even though he had personally wished to disengage himself 
from the issues relevant to the State Department, Foulk eventually decided to report 
Bayard on Parker’s reckless drinking habits.” 228  Only three months later, the U.S. 
government dismissed Parker. Until Hugh A. Dinsmore arrived in Korea on March 31, 
1887, Foulk once again served both as the Naval Attaché and interim U.S. Minister to 
Korea. He still assured others that he was still “fully determined to serve Korea,” but he 
simultaneously complained about his mental and physical sufferings.229  
In the end, when he learned about his dismissal, Foulk expressed mixed feelings 
of anger and relief. He could have still remained in Korea if he had accepted the King’s 
offer to retire from the Navy and serve as a civilian advisor to the King. Since February 
1887, the King repeatedly asked Foulk if he could join the Korean government. After 
being frustrated by Washington’s refusal to send its military advisors, the King asked 
Foulk if he could rather serve as the first American man “in charge of a new battalion of 
troops.”230 Foulk expressed enormous gratitude to the King, who even sent an officer to 
help him escape from a secret plot by the Chinese minister. The minister had planned to 
attack Foulk with “some Chinese soldiers disguised as Koreans” in Seoul.231 But in the 
end, Foulk believed that he could not continue making accomplishments for Korea when 
pro-Chinese officials occupied most of the positions and continuously threatened his life 
227 Foulk to Bayard, September 7, 1886, comp. McCune and Harrison, KAR 1, 43-44.     
228 Foulk to his parents, July 10, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 164. 
229 Foulk to his parents and brother, October 3, 1886, comp. Hawley, AMK, 171. 
230 Foulk to his parents and brother, March 27, 1887, comp. Hawley, AMK, 193. 
231 Foulk, June 28, 1887, comp. Hawley, AMK, 207. 
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with rumors and secret plots. Foulk refused the offer and bid final farewell to Korea on 
June 28, 1887.232   
Foulk arrived in Nagasaki on June 30 and soon asked the Navy Department if he 
could serve as the new naval attaché to Tokyo. But even this request was rejected by the 
State Department because Secretary Bayard worried that his appointment might disrupt 
U.S.-China relations. 233 After hearing that his requested had been denied by the 
government, Foulk lost his desire to serve his country. A year later, he decided to leave 
the Navy and start his own career. 
After being discharged from the Navy, Foulk married a Japanese woman and 
moved to Yokohama. He briefly worked for the American Trading Company, and later 
worked as a professor at the Doshisha College, an institution supported by Christian 
missionaries.234 In 1893, Foulk unexpectedly died of a heart failure. At the time of his 
death, he was only 36 years old. The mental and physical struggles in Korea contributed 
to his premature death.235 Foulk is now buried with his Japanese wife in Kyoto.236 
 
 
 
 
232 Foulk to his parents and brother, July 3, 1887, comp. Hawley, AMK, 197-198. 
233 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 21. 
234 Ibid., 21. 
235 Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, 77. 
236 Introduction, comp. Hawley, AMK, 21-22.     
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 Conclusion: Idealism vs. Realpolitik 
During the initial contact among separate, distant countries, the character of the 
pioneering visitor could not be ignored. He or she had the power to set up rules and 
practices that affect the relationship among these entities. But most importantly, his or 
her character became the image of the country represented. Therefore, a look at the life 
and career of George Clayton Foulk must be important in studying U.S.-Korea relations.    
An energetic naval officer with strong opinions and pride, Foulk was not an ideal 
diplomat. A skillful diplomat would be expected to openly avoid making enemies. But 
Foulk could not prevent himself from making harsh judgments of other figures. Rather 
than establishing good relations with Chinese officials in Seoul, he disliked Yuan Shikai 
and saw him as a hoodlum. Next, he severely criticized other American officials like 
Foote and Parker of being incapable diplomats. In his personal letters, Foulk even 
criticized Dinsmore because became impatient over the Arkansas lawyer’s lax personality. 
Finally, Foulk could also have avoided the accusation that he had defamed the royal 
family. No one could entirely blame Foulk because the State Department had decided to 
publish the report on the royal family, but Foulk should have been more careful by giving 
directions on what must be published and must not be published.   
This relentless and slightly impetuous manner, however, led Foulk to overstep the 
expected role of a diplomat. Rather than merely focusing on the safety of American 
residents and businesses in Korea, Foulk technically became an advisor to the Korean 
government. He also helped bring several likeminded American men and women who 
59 
 
devoted their life to the education, cure, and freedom of the Korean people. Horace 
Newton Allen, one of these likeminded American men in Korea, later became the U.S. 
Minister to Korea and continued to follow the footsteps of Foulk. Due to their efforts, 
many Koreans believed that their lives had been changed by the support from American-
built schools and hospitals. Later, these young Koreans eventually “emerged as political 
luminaries in Korean reform or nationalist movements.” 237 They spread the positive 
image of the U.S. across the Korean society, even while the American government signed 
a secret agreement that supported the Japanese occupation of Korea. Therefore, even 
though Foulk never established a long-term, successful career as a diplomat, he played a 
significant role in improving the Koreans’ perspective of the United States.               
Due to his selfless work for Korea, many Americans and Koreans saw Foulk as an 
idealist. The world ‘idealist’ must be understood with caution because even though Foulk 
was an idealist, he did not express an overly optimistic view of the future of Korea. Since 
he spoke Korean and learned a lot about Korea through his friendships and journeys, 
Foulk knew the harsh realities of Korea more than any other foreigners. Later, he also 
accurately predicted that despite their openness to Western technology and values, 
progressive Koreans would lose their power if they launched a premature coup against 
the conservatives. These examples show that Foulk was not oblivious to the difficulties 
which had haunted Korea.   
But in one aspect, Foulk never gave up his idealism. He always believed that the 
conduct and mission of American government must be different from those of other 
237 Lew, Early Korean Encounters with the United States and Japan, 12. 
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nations. As a firm supporter of American exceptionalism, Foulk believed that the 
American government must spread the unique values of American government, economy, 
society, and technology across the world. Furthermore, he hoped that he could be part of 
this noble mission. This hope eventually led Foulk to spend his youth and energy to work 
as a messenger of American values. In some ways, Foulk even advocated a stricter 
version of American exceptionalism than his contemporaries. He believed that 
Americana must further distinguish itself from other Western countries by spreading its 
values through peaceful means, not through violence. So when a few U.S. government 
officials tried to receive reparations from the Korean government even more than a 
decade after the General Sherman incident, Foulk criticized these American officials. He 
wrote that “the Sherman’s people had no business to go to Korea, as Korea forbade 
foreigners from coming there, and again, all accounts agree in that the foreigners fired off 
guns, which made the Koreans believe they came to do harm.”238 In the end, even though 
he quickly realized that chance of success for Korea would be slim, Foulk still believed 
he must fulfill the role of a dutiful American citizen by devoting himself to the welfare of 
Korea.         
But his projection of the mission of American government was not universally 
shared by all Americans. Policymakers in Washington, who saw the world from a 
realpolitik perspective, disagreed with Foulk. They never believed that America had 
political and economic reasons to support Korea. Therefore, officials in the State 
Department frequently refused Foulk’s requests to help the Korean government and 
238 Foulk to his parents and brother, October 13, 1885, comp. Hawley, AMK, 131. 
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American mission in Seoul. Rather, they often warned Foulk to not intervene in Korea-
China relations nor give too many advices to the King. Later, Foulk recognized this 
realpolitik decision-making and therefore tried to change the minds of the State 
Department officials by searching for commercial interests in Korea. But a small number 
of gold mines and pearl oysters never drew enough attention from Washington.  
The analysis of George Clayton Foulk ended with a debate between idealism and 
realpolitik. Even Foulk would not disagree with the State Department that helping Korea 
would never bring imminent benefits for the U.S. government.  But it would be wrong to 
simply reject Foulk’s vision of American government as a naïve, costly idea. If people 
like Foulk, Dinsmore, and Allen had wholeheartedly followed the advices from 
Washington and idly watched the sufferings of the Korean people, future generations of 
Koreans would not have seen America as an exceptional nation. Instead, many of them 
could have perceived America as another imperialistic country. Under such scenario, 
America could have faced bigger troubles when strategic value of Korea increased during 
the Cold War. One cannot go back 130 years to eliminate Foulk to compare Korea with 
and without Foulk. Still, it would be wrong to reject the work of these idealistic 
Americans who believed that their selfless devotion to helping other nations follow the 
United States’ footsteps would eventually benefit all nations, including the United States 
itself.     
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